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101 
FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION AFTER  
ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT (2017) 
Terrye Conroy* & Mitchell L. Yell** 
On March 22, 2017, Chief Justice John Roberts announced the 
unanimous ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Endrew F. ex 
rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1 (hereinafter 
“Endrew”).1  More than thirty-five years earlier, on June 28, 1982, 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist announced the High Court’s decision 
in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District 
v. Rowley (hereinafter “Rowley”).2  The decision in the Rowley case 
was the first special education ruling by the Supreme Court.  The 
Endrew decision was the High Court’s most recent special education 
ruling.  Both cases involved the question of what constitutes a free 
appropriate public education (hereinafter “FAPE”) as required by the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter “IDEA”).3   
The purpose of this article is to analyze the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Endrew.  In Part I we discuss the development of the FAPE 
requirement of the IDEA.  In Part II we analyze the Supreme Court’s 
FAPE ruling in Rowley.  Part III presents the split among the circuits 
that made the Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari likely.  In Part IV 
we analyze the Supreme Court’s ruling in Endrew and the conclusion 
of the case in the U.S. District Court. In Part V we present subsequent 
lower court rulings that have applied the Endrew standard.  We end, in 
Part VI, by discussing implications of the Endrew decision. 
 
* Terrye Conroy is the Assistant Director of Legal Research Instruction at the University of 
South Carolina School of Law and a former disability lawyer. 
** Mitchell Yell is the Fred and Francis Lester Palmetto Chair of Teacher Education and 
Professor of Special Education at the University of South Carolina. 
1 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
2 458 U.S. 176 (1982).  
3 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2018). 
1
Conroy and Yell: Free Appropriate Public Education
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
102 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAPE 
In the early 1970s, the Bureau for the Education of the 
Handicapped in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare provided data to subcommittees in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and U.S. Senate that indicated that of more than 8 
million children and youth with disabilities in the U.S. approximately 
1.75 million, or over 21%, of these students were not receiving a public 
education and another 2.5 million, or 31%, were not receiving an 
education that was appropriate for their needs.4  Thus, over 50% of 
children and youth with disabilities were either not allowed entry in 
the public education system or when they were in the system, they 
received an inappropriate education.  According to Edwin Martin, a 
former director of the Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped, 
the children with disabilities who were in inappropriate public school 
programs  
were frequently subjected to substandard services in 
poor facilities. Parents reported classes in basements, 
janitor’s closets, condemned buildings and similar 
sites. Children were often placed in classes 
inappropriate for their needs, for example it was not 
uncommon to find students with cerebral palsy, no 
matter what their intelligence level, placed in classes 
for children with mental retardation. Even when 
programs were offered, they frequently were not staffed 
by appropriately trained teachers, and instructors 
generally had to create their own curricula and 
materials. Supplies were limited or non-existent.5 
In the early 1970s, parents of children with disabilities began 
going to federal courts asserting that when public schools denied 
enrollment or services to their children, the schools were denying their 
children’s constitutional rights.6  In two seminal cases, Pennsylvania 
Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania7 
 
4 H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 11 (1975).  See also S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975), as reprinted 
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432. 
5 EDWIN W. MARTIN, BREAKTHROUGH: FEDERAL SPECIAL EDUCATION LEGISLATION 1965-
1981 loc. 321 (2013) (ebook).  
6 REED MARTIN, EXTRAORDINARY CHILDREN ORDINARY LIVES: STORIES BEHIND SPECIAL 
EDUCATION CASE LAW 1 (1991). 
7 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
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and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia,8 two U.S. 
District Courts ruled that after having undertaken to provide an 
education for all children, a state could not deny students with 
disabilities access to free public education.  These cases set a 
precedent, which led to over 46 similar right to education cases being 
filed in 28 states,9 and led to a flurry of activity in state legislatures 
creating educational rights for students with disabilities.  
Unfortunately, states’ efforts were very uneven, and many 
representatives from the states as well as persons in the United States 
government believed a federal role in the education of children and 
youth with disabilities was needed to ensure that such students would 
receive an appropriate education.10  In fact, Senator Harrison Williams, 
the chief sponsor of legislation on the education of students with 
disabilities, noted that “[i]t is time that Congress took strong and 
forceful action.  It is time for Congress to assure equal protection of 
the laws and to provide to all handicapped children their right to 
education.”11 
An increased awareness of the poorly met needs of students 
with disabilities, the judicial decisions finding constitutional 
requirements for educating children and youth with disabilities in 
public schools, and the inability of states to provide educational 
opportunities for students with disabilities were among the most salient 
factors12 that led to the enactment of the Education of All Handicapped 
Children Act (hereinafter “EAHCA”) in 1975.13  The major purpose of 
the law was to assist states to provide all eligible students with 
disabilities14 an appropriate individualized educational program, which 
 
8 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
9 H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3 (1975). 
10 Id. at 11.  See also S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8, as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 
1432. 
11 121 CONG. REC. 19,485 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams). 
12 NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RES. SERV., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
ACT: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 1 (1995), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7997 
/m1/1/high_res_d/95-669A_1995May19.pdf.  
13 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(prior to 1990 amendment).  In 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476 changed the name of the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
frequently referred to as the IDEA.  The law also eliminated the word “handicapped” and 
substituted the word “disability.”  The law’s name change emphasized people first language, 
in which the person comes before the disability (e.g., child with a disability rather than a 
disabled child). 
14 For students with disabilities to be eligible for special education services under the IDEA 
a team consisting of a student’s parents and school-based personnel must determine that a 
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was referred to in the EAHCA as a FAPE.15  The EAHCA included a 
set of procedural requirements to ensure that eligible students with 
disabilities receive a FAPE.16  The procedural requirements, which 
were enforceable in court, were intended to protect students with 
disabilities from unilateral decisions by school personnel by ensuring 
that parents were involved throughout the special education process.17   
A FAPE consists of special education services that are 
individually designed to meet a student with disabilities’ unique 
educational needs.  The IDEA defines a FAPE as special education and 
related services that— 
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction, and without charge; 
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary 
school, or secondary school education in the State 
involved; and 
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized 
education program.18 
According to the IDEA, a FAPE is delivered in conformity 
with a student’s individualized education program (hereinafter 
“IEP”).19  A student’s IEP is both a process in which his or her parents 
and school-based personnel develop the student’s special education 
program and the document in which the program is memorialized.20  
Thus, an IEP, which the United States Supreme Court has described as 
the “centerpiece”21 and “modus operandi”22 of the EAHCA, is the 
 
student has one of more disabilities covered by the IDEA and that the student needs special 
education services.  The disabilities covered under the IDEA include: autism, deaf-blindness, 
deafness, emotional disturbance, hearing impairment, intellectual disability, multiple 
disabilities, orthopedic impairment, other health impairment, specific learning disability, 
speech or language impairment, traumatic brain injury, visual impairment including blindness.  
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2018). 
15 See id. § 1401(9). 
16 See id. § 1415. 
17 MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 223-26 (4th ed. 2016).  
18 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 
19 Id. § 1401(9)(D). 
20 Mitchell L. Yell et al., The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Evolution of 
Special Education Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 55-62 (James M. Kauffman et 
al. eds., 2d ed. 2017).  
21 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). 
22 Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 367-69 
(1985). 
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blueprint of a student’s FAPE.23  Because the statutory definition does 
not set forth any particular level of educational benefit that a student 
must achieve to be provided a FAPE, its meaning has been subject to 
dispute.24  Many of these disputes were settled in due process hearings 
and in formal litigation.  Typically, these disputes involved questions 
about what degree of educational benefit a FAPE should provide.  In 
1982, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the EAHCA’s 
FAPE mandate in Rowley.25 
II. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. ROWLEY (1982) 
Amy Rowley was a young child with a severe hearing 
impairment.  She attended Furnace Woods Elementary School in the 
Hendrick Hudson Central School District in Peekskill, New York.26  
During the year that Amy began attending Furnace Woods, she was 
placed in a regular kindergarten class.  Because Amy was eligible for 
services under the EAHCA, she was entitled to receive a FAPE.  An 
IEP was developed for her during the fall of her first-grade year; 
however, it did not include a sign language interpreter, as requested by 
Amy’s parents.27  School personnel agreed to a three-week test period 
with an interpreter.  After the test period, the district decided not to 
provide the services of an interpreter to Amy.28  The parents requested 
a due process hearing and then a state review.  Amy’s parents lost at 
both administrative levels and appealed the case to the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, which overturned the 
administrative decisions and ruled in favor of Amy, ruling that the 
school district had failed to provide Amy with a FAPE, thus violating 
the EAHCA.29  The court concluded that Amy was performing better 
than many children in her class and was passing from grade to grade; 
 
23 Mitchell L. Yell et al., Special Education Law for Leaders and Administrators of Special 
Education, in HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION 95 
(Jean B. Crockett et al. eds., 2012).  
24 DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER ET AL., NAVIGATING SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY 176 
(2012). 
25 See generally Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 
(1982). 
26 Id. at 184. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 185. 
29 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
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however, “she understands considerably less of what goes on in class 
than she could if she were not deaf.”30  Additionally, Amy was “not 
learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she would 
without her handicap.”31  The school district’s special education 
program, therefore, should have provided Amy with “an opportunity 
to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity 
provided to other children.”32   
The school district filed an appeal and a divided panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s 
ruling that the school district had failed to provide Amy with a FAPE.33  
The school district then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
which granted certiorari in November 1981.34  The High Court 
addressed two questions: “What is meant by the [EAHCA’s] 
requirement of a ‘free appropriate public education’?  And what is the 
role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by [the 
EAHCA]?”35 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the 6 to 
3 majority.36  In the ruling, which was issued on June 28, 1982, the 
Supreme Court held that the school district had provided a FAPE.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote “we hold that [the school district] 
satisfies [the FAPE] requirement by providing personalized instruction 
with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit 
educationally from that instruction.”37  He further wrote “if 
personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive 
services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction . . . the child 
is receiving a ‘free appropriate public education’ as defined by the 
Act.”38  Thus, the Court rejected the lower court’s requirement that to 
confer a FAPE, school districts had to provide an education that 
allowed a student an equal opportunity to achieve to his or her 
maximum potential.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the majority 
opinion:  
 
30 Id. at 532. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 534. 
33 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
34 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 454 U.S. 961 (1981). 
35 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982). 
36 Id. at 179. 
37 Id. at 203. 
38 Id. at 189. 
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The requirement that States provide “equal” 
educational opportunities would thus seem to present 
an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible 
measurements and comparisons. . . . [T]o require, on 
the other hand, the furnishing of every special service 
necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s 
potential is, we think, further than Congress intended to 
go.39 
The Court developed a two-part test for courts to use when 
ruling on FAPE.  “First, has the [school] complied with the procedures 
of the Act?  And second, is the individualized educational program 
developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits?”40  According to the 
Court, if these requirements were met, a school had complied with the 
FAPE requirements.41  
In the years following the Rowley decision, lower courts used 
the two-part Rowley test to decide FAPE cases.  The procedural part of 
the test, part 1, seemed to be relatively straightforward, however, the 
educational benefit part of the test, part 2, proved to be a more difficult 
determination for courts.   
III. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS 
During this period, various U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals 
began to apply different standards in deciding what amount of 
educational benefits was necessary for a school district to have 
conferred a FAPE.  The U.S. Solicitor General referred to this split 
among the courts as “[a]n [e]ntrenched [a]nd [a]cknowledged [c]ircuit 
[c]onflict.”42  Although all the circuit courts had agreed with the overall 
Rowley standard that an IEP must be “reasonably calculated to provide 
educational benefits,”43 the difference among the courts was on the 
amount of educational benefit that would satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
FAPE requirement.  At least six circuits, the Second, Fourth, Seventh, 
 
39 Id. at 198-99. 
40 Id. at 206-07 (footnote omitted). 
41 Id. at 207. 
42 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas 
Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/15-827-US-Amicus.pdf. 
43 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
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Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh,44 had adopted some variation of a some 
or de minimis degree of educational benefit as being sufficient to 
confer a FAPE, a very low educational benefit standard that only 
required that the educational benefit provided by a school district be 
“just barely more than trivial.”45  Two other circuits, the Third and the 
Sixth, adopted a meaningful benefit standard, which was higher than 
the some or de minimis standard.46  In fact, the Third and Sixth Circuits 
affirmatively rejected the de minimis standard as insufficient to satisfy 
the FAPE requirement.47  The First and Fifth Circuits held that the 
FAPE standards required more than simply a trivial or de minimis 
educational benefit while noting that access had to be meaningful, 
nonetheless, it seemed that in rulings neither circuit court required 
much more than the lower standard to satisfy the FAPE requirement.48  
The Ninth Circuit was divided with the panels disagreeing with each 
other over the correct educational benefit standard.49 
This split made it more likely that the Supreme Court would 
eventually hear another FAPE case to interpret the educational benefit 
standard set in Rowley.  This opportunity presented itself in an appeal 
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Endrew F. ex rel. 
Joseph F. v Douglas County School District in 2015.50  In this case, the 
Tenth Circuit had used the educational benefit standard of “merely . . 
. more than de minimis”51 as being sufficient to confer a FAPE.  
The case involved Endrew, a student in the fourth grade in the 
Douglas County School District in Colorado.  Endrew had autism and 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and had an IEP throughout his 
early school years.52  His parents, alleging that Endrew had failed to 
progress academically or functionally in the fourth grade, rejected 
Endrew’s IEP and placed him in a private school, the Firefly Autism 
House.53  Endrew’s parents noticed a dramatic difference in his 
behavior and achievement while he was in the private school 
 
44 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 9. 
45 Id. at 9-10. 
46 Mitchell L. Yell & David F. Bateman, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District 
(2017): FAPE and the U.S. Supreme Court, 50 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 7 (2017). 
47 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 10. 
48 Id. at 10 n.4. 
49 Id. 
50 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015). 
51 Id. at 1338 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996 (2017). 
53 Id. 
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placement.54  Nonetheless, they wanted their son to be educated in a 
public school so they approached the Douglas County School District 
about re-enrolling Endrew in their home school and developing a new 
IEP based on his successful programming at the Firefly Autism 
House.55  Unfortunately, Endrew’s parents believed the IEP was not an 
improvement over the previous IEP they had rejected.  Endrew’s 
parents continued his placement at the Firefly Autism House and filed 
for a due process hearing in which they argued that the Douglas County 
School District had failed to provide him with a FAPE for which they 
sought tuition reimbursement for his private school placement .56  The 
due process hearing officer and federal district court found that the 
Douglas County School District had provided a FAPE and denied 
Endrew’s parents tuition reimbursement.  The parents then appealed to 
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.57  The Tenth 
Circuit court found that the school district had met the “merely . . . 
more than de minimis” educational benefit test thus ruling that the 
school district provided Endrew with a FAPE.58  Although the Tenth 
Circuit court acknowledged that the meaningful educational benefit 
test was a higher standard that promised students with disabilities 
greater achievement than did the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis test,59 the 
court ruled: 
We find sufficient support in the record to affirm the 
findings of the administrative law judge that the child 
received some educational benefit while in the 
District’s care and that is enough to satisfy the District’s 
obligation to provide a free appropriate public 
education. . . .60 
This is without question a close case, but we 
find there are sufficient indications of Drew’s past 
 
54 Id. at 997.  
55 Ann Schimke, Inside One Colorado Family’s Long Legal Journey to Affirm Their Son’s 
Right to a Meaningful Education, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.chalkbeat.org/pos 
ts/co/2017/11/15/inside-one-colorado-familys-long-legal-journey-to-affirm-their-sons-right-
to-a-meaningful-education/. 
56 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 11-12. 
60 Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1332. 
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progress to find the IEP rejected by the parents 
substantively adequate under our prevailing standard.61 
Following the circuit court decision, the parents appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court.  The question presented to the Court was what 
is the level of educational benefit school districts must confer on 
children with disabilities to provide them with a FAPE guaranteed by 
the IDEA?  The parents argued that the Douglas County School 
District had failed to provide Endrew with a FAPE in accordance with 
the Rowley two-part FAPE test because the IEP was not reasonably 
calculated to provide him with educational benefit. 
On May 31, 2016, the U.S. Solicitor General was invited to file 
a brief in the case expressing the views of the United States.  On 
August 8, 2016, the Solicitor General’s amicus curiae brief was filed.  
In the twenty-one- page brief, the Solicitor General wrote: 
[T]he split of authority on the question presented is real, 
and only this Court can resolve it. There is no 
justification for providing children with disabilities 
different degrees of protection under federal law 
depending on where they happen to live. This Court 
should clarify the proper FAPE analysis and establish a 
uniform standard to guide courts, state educational 
agencies, and parents across the county.62 
On September 29, 2016, the High Court granted the petition for 
certiorari.63  The question Endrew’s parents asked the Supreme Court 
to answer was the following: “What is the level of educational benefit 
school districts must confer on children with disabilities to provide 
them with the free appropriate public education guaranteed by the 





61 Id. at 1342. 
62 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 13. 
63 See generally Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 29 
(2016). 
64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 
RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 29 (2016) (No. 15-827), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/201 
6/05/15-827-Petition-for-Certiorari.pdf. 
10
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IV. ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1 
(2017) 
In January 2017, the Court heard oral arguments in Endrew.  
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its opinion vacating the 
decision and remanding the case back to the Tenth Circuit.  Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for a unanimous65 Supreme Court.  
In his opinion Justice Roberts began with a statement acknowledging 
that the Court’s purpose in hearing the Endrew case was to bring clarity 
to the second prong of the Rowley tests when he wrote:  
Thirty-five years ago, this Court held that the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act establishes 
a substantive right to a “free appropriate public 
education” for certain children with disabilities. We 
declined, however, to endorse any one standard for 
determining “when handicapped children are receiving 
sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the 
requirements of the Act.” That “more difficult 
problem” is before us today.66 
Justice Roberts referred to the IEP as a “fact-intensive 
exercise”67 in which school personnel and a student’s parents 
collaborate to develop and implement a special education program.  
The focus of the IEP is on the unique needs of an individual student 
and is developed only after careful consideration of the student’s 
present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, 
his or her disability, and the student’s “potential for growth.”68  The 
Court noted that it is through the IEP that a FAPE is tailored to meet 
the unique needs of an individual student.69  Justice Roberts wrote that 
“[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress.  After all, 
the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing 
academic and functional advancement.”70   
The Court announced a new standard of educational benefit: 
“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must 
 
65 Because a justice had not been confirmed to the open seat previously occupied by Justice 
Antonin Scalia, there were only eight justices sitting on the Endrew case. 
66 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993 (citations omitted). 
67 Id. at 999.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 1000. 
70 Id. at 999. 
11
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offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress 
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”71  With respect to the 
new standard, Justice Roberts wrote: 
[T]his standard is markedly more demanding than the 
“merely more than de minimis” test applied by the 
Tenth Circuit. . . . [and that] a student offered an 
educational program providing “merely more than de 
minimis” progress from year to year can hardly be said 
to have been offered an education at all.72 
Although the Supreme Court justices rejected the lower de 
minimis standard, the Court did not embrace the higher standard 
requested by Endrew’s parents.  Endrew’s parents had asserted that the 
IDEA requires that school districts provide students with disabilities 
an education that is substantially equal to those opportunities provided 
to students without disabilities.73  Justice Roberts cited the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Rowley as rejecting the notion of equal opportunity 
because of unworkable standards, measurement, and comparisons that 
would be required.  Thus, the Court declined to interpret FAPE in a 
manner that was at odds with the Rowley decision. 
Nonetheless, the Endrew educational benefit standard is clearly 
higher than the standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit court.  In fact, 
Justice Roberts wrote that “[a] substantive standard not focused on 
student progress would do little to remedy the pervasive and tragic 
academic stagnation that prompted Congress to act.”74  It is also clear 
from the language in Endrew that the Court raised the educational 
benefit standard for all students with disabilities.75 
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Tenth 
Circuit court to reconsider its ruling in light of the new higher standard 
for educational benefit.76  On August 2, 2017, the Tenth Circuit court 
remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 1000-01. 
73 Brief for Petitioner at 40, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 
137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
15-827-petitioner-merits-brief.pdf. 
74 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. 
75 Julie Waterstone, Endrew F.: Symbolism v. Reality, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 527, 527-28 (2017). 
76 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1002. 
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Colorado, the first court to rule on Endrew, to reconsider its ruling in 
light of the Supreme Court’s higher educational benefit standard.77 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado issued its 
decision in the remand of Endrew on February 12, 2018.78  Judge 
Lewis Babcock reversed his original decision in favor of the Douglas 
County School District and ruled in favor of Endrew and his parents.79  
According to the judge, the Douglas County School District had failed 
to provide a FAPE to Endrew in light of the Supreme Court’s higher 
educational benefit standard.80  Judge Babcock ordered the Douglas 
County School District to reimburse Endrew’s tuition and related 
expenses that were incurred when they removed Endrew from the 
Douglas County School District and placed him in a private school, the 
Firefly Autism House, at their own expense.81  The judge also ordered 
the Douglas County School District to pay Endrew’s parents’ court 
costs and attorneys’ fees, which amounted to $1.3 million dollars.82 
V. POST ENDREW FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
For this article we used the Westlaw Citing References and 
KeyCite Alert tools to track and chart all federal court decisions that 
have addressed the new FAPE standard from the date of the Endrew 
decision (March 22, 2017) through July 15, 2018.  We excluded 
opinions that simply cited Endrew without any discussion of the new 
FAPE standard as well as decisions dealing with non-FAPE issues, 
e.g., exhausting administrative remedies.  The final chart appended at 
the end of this article is organized by federal circuits.83  The first entry 
is the citation and FAPE educational benefits standard applied in the 
latest pre-Endrew Court of Appeals case for that circuit.  Next, we 
included the most recent post-Endrew Court of Appeals decision, if 
any, followed by other court of appeals and district court decisions 
 
77 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 694 F. App’x 654, 655 (10th 
Cir. 2017). 
78 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1175 
(D. Colo. 2018).  
79 Id. at 1185-86. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 1186. 
82 Ann Schimke, Douglas County District Pays $1.3 Million to Settle Landmark Special 
Education Case, DENV. POST (June 20, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/06 
/20/douglas-county-district-special-education-case/. 
83 See infra Appendix A. 
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addressing Endrew’s new substantive FAPE standard in reverse 
chronological order.  
For each post-Endrew opinion in the chart, we included the 
procedural history, disposition, and the exact language used by that 
court in its analysis/application of the new Endrew standard.  We 
included opinions that discussed the new standard, even if the court 
remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Endrew 
decision.  We also included language used by the court to compare its 
circuit’s prior or current substantive FAPE standard to the new Endrew 
standard.  Lastly, we included published and “not selected for 
publication” decisions in the chart.  Rule 32.1(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure allows for the citation of judicial opinions, 
orders, and judgments issued on or after January 1, 2007 that have been 
designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” or “non-
precedential.”84  Furthermore, the precedential value of a specific 
federal court decision does not affect the outcome in that particular 
child’s case.   
Our purpose for creating this chart was not to compare the 
outcomes of pre- and post-Endrew FAPE decisions, but to explore how 
federal courts are interpreting the new substantive FAPE standard and 
how a court might compare the language used in Endrew to the 
language used pre- or post-Endrew in its Circuit.  
After we address the language used by each Circuit in its 
analysis of the new substantive FAPE standard, we share our 
observations from our review of these cases.  In Part VI, we end by 
discussing implications of the Endrew decision.  
A. Post Endrew Decisions by Circuit 
As stated earlier, part-two of the Rowley FAPE test asks: “is 
the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s 
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits?”85  However, the Court in Rowley cautioned: 
“We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the 
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered 
by the Act.”86  Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, 
federal courts across the circuits proceeded to use adjectives ranging 
 
84 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a). 
85 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982). 
86 Id. at 202. 
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from “some” to “meaningful” to quantify the educational benefits 
required for a FAPE.87  In 2017 the Supreme Court in Endrew 
pronounced its new substantive FAPE standard: 
While Rowley declined to articulate an 
overarching standard to evaluate the adequacy of the 
education provided under the Act, the decision and the 
statutory language point to a general approach: To meet 
its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school 
must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a 
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.88 
Although the Supreme Court explained that this new standard “is 
markedly more demanding than the ‘merely more than de minimis’ test 
applied by the Tenth Circuit,”89 it again declined to establish a “bright-
line rule.”90  Therefore, courts are now tasked with determining what 
effect, if any, this new substantive FAPE standard has on how it 
describes and measures the educational benefit or progress required to 
satisfy this new FAPE test. 
1. First Circuit 
In 2012, in D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals began by stating that the IDEA requires 
“more than a trivial educational benefit,” but concluded “to comply 
with the IDEA, an IEP must be reasonably calculated to confer a 
meaningful educational benefit.”91  As supporting authority, the court 
cited the 2010 Third Circuit opinion in D.S. v. Bayonne Board of 
Education.92  With its Elizabeth B. decision, the First Circuit joined the 
Third and Sixth Circuits, which had been the only circuits to apply the 
meaningful educational benefit standard.93  The First Circuit Court of 
Appeals has not decided a post-Endrew substantive FAPE case.  
 
87 See generally Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of 
How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 EDUC. LAW REP. 1 (2009); Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 8-12. 
88 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99 
(2017). 
89 Id. at 1000. 
90 Id. at 1001. 
91 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012). 
92 Id. (citing 602 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
93 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 9, 11. 
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However, in July 2017 in C.D. ex rel. M.D. v. Natick Public School 
District, a District of Massachusetts court stated that the Endrew 
standard was “not materially different from the standard set” by the 
First Circuit in Elizabeth B. and that the educational benefit described 
in Endrew as “‘appropriate’ educational progress” was consistent with 
its “meaningful educational benefit” standard.94  The C.D. court cited 
a “meaningful benefit” case from a district court in the Third Circuit.95 
2. Second Circuit 
In 1998, the court in Walczak v. Florida Union Free School 
District set the substantive FAPE standard for the Second Circuit as 
more than “trivial advancement,” and “likely to produce progress, not 
regression.”96  Post-Endrew, in Mr. P. v. West Hartford Board of 
Education, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s judgment for the school district because it “provided M.P. with 
a meaningful educational program that was reasonably calculated to 
enable M.P. to make progress appropriate in light of his 
circumstances.”97 Interestingly, however, citing the pre-Endrew 
Walczak decision, the court in Mr. P. also stated that its prior decisions 
applying the “likely to produce progress, not regression” standard, 
were consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew.98  Most 
of the post-Endrew district court opinions from the Second Circuit 
simply apply the Endrew standard of “reasonably calculated to enable 
a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances”99 without addressing the level of educational benefit or 
progress required for a FAPE.  Some appear to continue to apply the 
“likely to produce progress, not regression” standard.100   
 
94 No. 15-13617-FDS, 2017 WL 3122654, at *16 (D. Mass. July 21, 2017). 
95 Id. (citing Brandywine Heights Area Sch. Dist. v. B.M., 248 F. Supp. 3d 618, 632 n.25 
(E.D. Pa. 2017)). 
96 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998). 
97 885 F.3d 735, 757 (2d Cir. 2018). 
98 Id. 
99 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99 
(2017). 
100 See, e.g., MB v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, No. 17-CV-1273 (KBF), 2018 WL 
1609266, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018); F.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Great Neck U.F.S.D., 274 
F. Supp. 3d 94, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Avaras v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 15 Civ. 2042 
(NSR), 2017 WL 3037402, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017). 
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3. Third Circuit 
In Ridley School District v. M.R., a 2012 pre-Endrew decision, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[a]lthough a state is 
not required to maximize the potential of every handicapped child, it 
must supply an education that provides ‘significant learning’ and 
‘meaningful benefit’ to the child.”101  The Third Circuit has not decided 
a post-Endrew substantive FAPE case; however, the post-Endrew 
district court opinions from the Third Circuit continue to require a 
meaningful educational benefit.  In July of 2018, in Jack J. ex rel. 
Jennifer S. v. Coatesville Area School District, the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania upheld the standard applied by the hearing officer who 
concluded that “[t]he IEP must be ‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the 
child to receive appropriate services in light of the child’s individual 
circumstances” and “services are appropriate when they are reasonably 
calculated to provide a child with ‘meaningful educational 
benefits.’”102  Other district courts in the Third Circuit have noted that 
the Third Circuit’s meaningful benefit standard is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s Endrew decision.103  Some, however, have 
substituted “in light of the student’s intellectual potential” for “in light 
of the child’s circumstances.”104 
4. Fourth Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in its 2012 O.S. ex 
rel. Michael S. v. Fairfax County School Board opinion made it clear 
that absent an “express acknowledgment” from Congress of its intent 
to abrogate Supreme Court precedent, that the Fourth Circuit, like the 
Tenth Circuit in Endrew, applied a “some” not a “meaningful” benefit 
standard, meaning a benefit that is “more than minimal or trivial.”105  
Although the Fourth Circuit has not decided a post-Endrew substantive 
 
101 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).   
102 No. 17-CV-3793, 2018 WL 3397552, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2018) (alteration in 
original).  
103 Sean C. ex rel. Helen C. v. Oxford Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-5286, 2017 WL 3485880, 
at *9 n.13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2017). 
104 See, e.g., Montgomery Cty. Intermediate Unit No. 23 v. C.M., No. 17-1523, 2017 WL 
4548022, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2017); Benjamin A. ex rel. Michael v. Unionville-Chadds 
Ford Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-2545, 2017 WL 3482089, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2017); L.M. v. 
Willingboro Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-3672, 2017 WL 2539388, at *6 (D.N.J. June 12, 
2017). 
105 804 F.3d 354, 359-60 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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FAPE case, in M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Smith, the court acknowledged 
that its “some” benefit standard had been “overturned” by the Supreme 
Court in Endrew.106  However, the court declined to address the effects 
of Endrew on its precedent because the remedy sought by M.L.’s 
parents, to provide religious instruction, was not available under the 
IDEA.107  A few months later, in N.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Maxwell, the 
Fourth Circuit again recognized the new substantive FAPE standard in 
Endrew, noting that the ALJ quoted the “more than de minimis” 
standard in her pre-Endrew opinion, which the Supreme Court 
“invalidated” in Endrew.108  Stressing the importance of deference,109 
the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions to allow the ALJ to decide “whether the outcome of the 
case is different under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Endrew.”110  
The district courts in the Fourth Circuit have also not actually 
addressed the educational benefit or progress required under the new 
substantive FAPE standard.  In Sauers v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth 
County Board of Education, the Middle District of North Carolina 
court stated that the “Fourth Circuit’s FAPE standard has come into 
question” after Endrew, remanded the case back to the state after 
questioning the standard applied by the ALJ and the SRO, who 
“referred to ‘educational benefits’ but did not expound upon exactly 
where on the spectrum said benefits were deemed adequate.”111  
However, in J.R v. Smith, after acknowledging the “now-invalid 
Fourth Circuit standard from O.S.,” a Maryland District Court declined 
to remand because in her pre-Endrew decision the ALJ “went beyond 
the ‘more than de minimus [sic]’ standard from O.S. and laid out an 
approach that evaluated what progress was appropriate in light of the 
child’s circumstances, just as Endrew F. requires.”112 
 
106 867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017).  
107 Id. at 499. 
108 711 F. App’x 713, 719 (4th Cir. 2017). 
109 Id. at 716-17. 
110 Id. at 719. 
111 No. 1:15CV427, 2018 WL 1621516, at *12 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2018). 
112 No. DKC 16-1633, 2017 WL 3592453, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2017).  
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5. Fifth Circuit 
In 2016, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rockwall 
Independent School District v. M.C. described its circuit’s substantive 
FAPE standard as “likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial 
educational advancement” while noting that “the educational benefit 
that an IEP is designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful.’”113  However, 
in his amicus brief for the United States in Endrew, the U.S. Solicitor 
General questioned whether the Fifth Circuit would actually require 
more than a “trivial benefit” for a school district to have provided a 
FAPE.114  
Post-Endrew, on July 27, 2017, in Dallas Independent School 
District v. Woody, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decisions of both the hearing officer and the district court for the 
Northern District of Texas that the school district had denied a 
FAPE.115  In that case, the Fifth Circuit, citing Endrew, simply stated 
that the school district “was obligated to ‘offer an IEP reasonably 
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the 
child’s circumstances.’”116  However in a footnote the court stated that 
to provide a FAPE a child must “receive a meaningful educational 
benefit.”117 
A month before, in C.G. ex rel. Keith G. v. Waller Independent 
School District, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas had applied a standard 
consistent with the Endrew decision.118  The district court had rejected 
the de minimis benefit standard for one that is “likely to produce 
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement”119 and 
concluded that the C.G.’s IEP had been “reasonabl[y] based on her 
specific needs and progress.”120  The Fifth Circuit  ruled that 
“[a]lthough the district court did not articulate the standard set forth in 
 
113 816 F.3d 329, 338 (5th Cir. 2016). 
114 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 10 n.4.  It is not clear, 
however, whether those circuits would hold that the provision of anything beyond a trivial 
benefit necessarily means that the education provided is “meaningful” and thus satisfies the 
FAPE standard. 
115 865 F.3d 303, 317 (5th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that the school district failed to make a 
timely offer of FAPE). 
116 Id. at 317. 
117 Id. at 322 n.8. 
118 697 F. App’x 816 (5th Cir. 2017). 
119 Id. at 819. 
120 Id. 
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Endrew F. verbatim, its analysis of C.G.’s IEP is fully consistent with 
that standard and leaves no doubt that the court was convinced that 
C.G.’s IEP was ‘appropriately ambitious in light of [her] 
circumstances.’”121 
A week before the Fifth Circuit’s decision in C.G., a U.S. 
Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Texas also rejected the de 
minimis benefit standard for one “likely to produce progress, not 
regression or trivial educational advancement.”122  In E.R. ex rel. S.R. 
v. Spring Branch Independent School District,123 Judge Milloy 
articulated the court’s post-Endrew standard as: “[T]he educational 
benefit that an IEP is designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful’ and 
‘appropriately ambitious in light of the student’s circumstances.’”124 
6. Sixth Circuit 
In 2004, in Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Third Circuit to require a 
“meaningful educational benefit”125 stating “we agree that the IDEA 
requires an IEP to confer a ‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in 
relation to the potential of the child at issue.”126  The Sixth Circuit has 
not decided a post-Endrew substantive FAPE case; however, the 
standard articulated in the post-Endrew district court decisions from 
the Sixth Circuit appears to focus on the unique needs, circumstances, 
or potential of the child without addressing an appropriate measure of 
educational benefit or progress.  In D.L. v. St. Louis City Public School 
District, the court for the Eastern District of Missouri, noting that the 
IEP “must be responsive to the student’s specific disabilities, whether 
academic or behavioral,”127 held that the responsibility of the district 
was to provide services “tailored to the unique needs of a particular 
child.”128  In Barney v. Akron Board of Education, the district court for 
the Northern District of Ohio, stating that the Supreme Court in 
 
121 Id. 
122 E.R. ex rel. S.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:16-CV-0058, 2017 WL 
3017282, at *13 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2017). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. (citing Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 
1001 (2017)). 
125 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004). 
126 Id. at 862. 
127 326 F. Supp. 3d 810, 824 (E.D. Mo. 2018). 
128 Id. (citing Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994). 
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Endrew required an IEP to be “judged as appropriate based on the 
individual child’s potential,” described an IEP providing a FAPE as 
one that is “appropriately ambitious in light of [the child’s] 
circumstances.”129  Lastly, focusing on the child’s circumstances, the 
Eastern District of Tennessee in I.L. ex rel. Taylor v. Knox County 
Board. of Education ruled that although the school district refused to 
implement 13 of I.L.’s goals when her mother rejected an offer for 
additional special education services, I.L. was not denied a FAPE.130  
7. Seventh Circuit 
In its 2011 M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools 
opinion, the Seventh Circuit, citing the Second and the Fifth, stated: 
“We reiterate that an IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child 
to receive an educational benefit ‘when it is “likely to produce 
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement.”’”131  As 
of July 15, 2018, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had not decided 
a post-Endrew FAPE educational benefits case, nor had any district 
court in the Seventh Circuit. 
8. Eighth Circuit 
In 2011, in K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Independent School District No. 
15, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Rowley, applied the 
“some educational benefit” standard to determine whether a child was 
provided a FAPE.132  Post-Endrew, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has not addressed the level of educational benefit or progress required 
for a FAPE.  In its I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public 
Schools opinion, the Eighth Circuit simply cited Endrew for a FAPE 
requiring “progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances” 
and for the IDEA not requiring a particular outcome, i.e., braille 
sufficiency.133  
The district courts in the Eighth Circuit have also applied the 
Endrew’s “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in 
 
129 No. 5:16CV0112, 2017 WL 4226875, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2017) (citing Endrew 
F., 137 S. Ct. at 999). 
130 257 F. Supp. 3d 946, 981, 995 (E.D. Tenn. 2017). 
131 668 F.3d 851, 862 (7th Cir. 2011). 
132 647 F.3d 795, 809 (8th Cir. 2011). 
133 863 F.3d 966, 971 (8th Cir. 2017).  
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light of the child’s circumstances”134 standard without addressing the 
level of educational benefit or progress required for a FAPE.135  In 
Paris School District v. A.H. ex rel. Harter, the court for the Western 
District of Arkansas acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Endrew 
had rejected the Eighth Circuit’s “merely more than de minimis” 
standard.136  Recognizing that the hearing officer, pre-Endrew, had 
cited to circuits requiring a higher standard, the court stated that it 
would apply the Endrew standard.137  In doing so, the district court 
affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that the school district had 
denied A.H. a FAPE, but did not mention the level of educational 
benefit or progress required, except to note that the Court in Endrew 
described it as “markedly more demanding.”138 
9. Ninth Circuit 
In his amicus brief for the United States in Endrew, the U.S. 
Solicitor General noted that different panels of the Ninth Circuit had 
disagreed over the correct FAPE educational benefits standard.139  In 
its 2010 J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified School District decision, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described the appropriate benefit 
for a FAPE as “meaningful.”140  Post-Endrew, the Ninth Circuit 
decision in E.F. v. Newport Mesa Unified School District was 
remanded by the Supreme Court “for further consideration in light of” 
its Endrew decision.141  On remand, citing its other 2010 J.L. v. Mercer 
Island School District decision,142 the Ninth Circuit court found that 
the standard applied by the ALJ in E.F. was “proper even before 
Endrew clarified the Supreme Court’s holding in Rowley.”143  
However, in a footnote in the 2010 J.L decision, the Ninth Circuit 
 
134 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99 
(2017). 
135 See, e.g., Denny v. Bertha-Hewit Pub. Schs., No. 16-cv-1954, 2017 WL 4355968, at *20 
(D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2017); Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-CV-3011, 2017 
WL 2880853, at *4 (W.D. Ark. July 5, 2017).   
136 No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017). 
137 Id. at *5. 
138 Id. 
139 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 10 n.4. 
140 626 F.3d 431, 432-33 (9th Cir. 2010). 
141 726 F. App’x 535, 536 (9th Cir. 2018). 
142 592 F.3d 938, 951 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010). 
143 E.F., 726 F. App’x at 537. 
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acknowledged the confusion in its circuit.144  Nevertheless, in its 
unreported opinion in E.F., the Ninth Circuit appears to state the 
substantive FAPE standard as “‘reasonably calculated to enable [E.F.] 
to receive educational benefits’ and make appropriate progress in light 
of the circumstances.”145  The district courts in the Ninth Circuit have 
largely applied the Endrew substantive FAPE standard without 
elaborating on the measure of educational benefit or progress required 
for a FAPE.  Some have used the terms “appropriately ambitious” and 
“challenging objectives” from Endrew.146  In Unknown Party v. 
Gilbert Unified School District, the court for the District of Arizona 
used the term “meaningful benefit” when it held that although the 
parents were satisfied with “some progress,” the school district could 
unilaterally change schools to provide more for their son.147  The court 
reasoned that a “[s]tudent’s circumstances do not require lowering the 
properly-calibrated IEP goals for his progress.”148 
10. Tenth Circuit 
Endrew was a Tenth Circuit case.149  The Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and 
“remanded for further proceedings consistent” with its opinion.150  The 
Tenth Circuit court in Endrew had applied the “more than de minimis” 
standard from its opinion in Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P 
ex rel. Jeff P.151  On remand from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit 
 
144 J.L., 592 F.3d at 952 n.10.  Some confusion exists in this circuit regarding whether the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires school districts to provide disabled 
students with “educational benefit,” “some educational benefit” or a “meaningful” educational 
benefit.  See, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (2008).  As 
we read the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, all three phrases refer to the same standard. 
School districts must, to “make such access meaningful,” confer at least “some educational 
benefit” on disabled students.  See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 172, 202.  For ease of discussion, we refer to this standard as the 
“educational benefit” standard. 
145 E.F., 726 F. App’x at 537 (alteration in original). 
146 See, e.g., Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist. v. D.W., 271 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1154 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017); K.M. ex rel. Markham v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-cv-001835, 2017 
WL 1348807, *17 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2017); N.G. ex rel. Green v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. 
Dist., No. 1:15-cv-01740-LJO-JLT, 2017 WL 1354687, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017).  
147 No. CV-16-02614-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL 3225189, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2017).  
148 Id. 
149 See generally Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 
1329 (10th Cir. 2015). 
150 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1002 (2017). 
151 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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vacated its prior decision and remanded to the District of Colorado to 
address the Supreme Court’s ruling.152  Judge Babcock, applying the 
Supreme Court’s new substantive FAPE standard, reversed his earlier 
decision concluding that: 
Petitioner and his parent have met their burden to prove 
that the District’s April 2010 IEP failed to create an 
educational plan that was reasonably calculated to 
enable Petitioner to make progress, even in light of his 
unique circumstances. The IEP was not appropriately 
ambitious because it did not give Petitioner the chance 
to meet challenging objectives under his particular 
circumstances.153 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided a post-
Endrew FAPE educational benefits case and there have been only a 
few district court decisions to address the substantive FAPE standard.  
There were two District of Colorado Smith v. Cheyenne Mountain 
School District decisions that appear to involve the same child who 
was represented by his mother pro se.  In the May 11, 2017 decision, 
the court noted that the ALJ’s decision preceded the reversal of the 
Tenth Circuit’s “simply more than de minimis” standard, but that 
remand was not necessary because the ALJ found that “M.S. had 
progressed.”154  The district court concluded that the evidence showed 
“M.S. made progress in the general education program that was 
appropriate to his circumstances.”155 In the second Smith decision, the 
court also appears to have applied the Endrew FAPE standard without 
addressing the measure of educational benefit or progress required for 
a FAPE.156  
The court for the District of New Mexico combined the words 
“some” and “meaningful” and “progress” in its Board of Education of 
Albuquerque Public Schools v. Maez decision when it found that 
“M.M. made some meaningful progress relative to the severity of his 
disabilities and the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable M.M. to 
 
152 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 694 F. App’x 654, 655 
(10th Cir. 2017). 
153 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1185-
86 (D. Colo. 2018). 
154 No. 15-00881-PAB-CBS, 2017 WL 2791415, at *7 n.11 (D. Colo. May 11, 2017). 
155 Id. 
156 Smith v. Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 14-CV-03390-PAB-KHR, 2018 WL 
1203172, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2018). 
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progress in light of his combination of disabilities.”157  The court 
concluded: “Thus, in light of these unique circumstances, the Court 
finds M.M. was making some meaningful progress.”158 
11. Eleventh Circuit 
In 2001, in Devine v. Indian River County School Board, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated emphatically that under the 
IDEA and Rowley a child was “only entitled to some educational 
benefit.”159  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided a 
post-Endrew substantive FAPE case.  
Of the few district court decisions from the Eleventh Circuit to 
address the new Endrew FAPE standard, one is from the Northern 
District of Alabama and the other from the Middle District of Florida.  
In Rosaria M. v. Madison City Board of Education, the Northern 
District of Alabama court described the Supreme Court’s Endrew 
decision, as in Rowley, as charting a “middle course,” requiring the 
court to determine “whether F.M.’s IEP was designed to challenge her 
and ‘to enable her to make progress appropriate in light of [her] 
circumstances.’”160  The S.M. v. Hendry County School Board case 
from the Middle District of Florida began with a U.S. Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation that the district court affirm the ALJ’s 
decision in favor of the school district.161  In Judge Mirando’s Report 
and Recommendation, she stressed that the IEP must be “reasonable,” 
which depends on the child’s “unique needs,” and that the program 
“must be appropriately ambitious” and include “challenging 
objectives.”162  The Magistrate Judge found that L.C’s “IEP was 
reasonably calculated to enable L.C to receive an educational benefit 
that would allow him to make appropriate progress in light of his 
unique circumstances.”163  The district court accepted Judge Mirando’s 
recommendation.164  In doing so the court reasoned that although the 
ALJ’s decision was three years before Endrew and applied the “more 
than trivial or de minimis progress” standard, that Judge Mirando 
 
157 No. 16-cv-1082 WJ/WPL, 2017 WL 3278945, at *5 (D.N.M. Aug 1, 2017). 
158 Id. at *13. 
159 249 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). 
160 325 F.R.D. 429, 447 (N.D. Ala. 2018). 
161 No. 2:14-CV-237-FTM-38CM, 2017 WL 9360881, at *21 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2017). 
162 Id. at *14. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at *3. 
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evaluated the case under the new standard and properly determined the 
ALJ’s findings were still entitled to “great deference.”165 
12. D.C. Circuit 
In 2015, in Leggett v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals maintained its “some [educational] benefit” standard 
for a child to receive a FAPE.166  Post-Endrew, the D.C. Circuit 
remanded the 2018 Z.B. v. District of Columbia case for “further 
consideration” of the adequacy of Z.B.’s IEP under the new Endrew 
standard167 because it appeared “more demanding” than the standard 
applied by the district court.168  Citing Endrew, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals advised the district court below that the Supreme Court 
stressed “challenging objectives” that are “appropriately ambitious in 
light of his circumstances”169 and that the “key inquiry” was whether 
the IEP “offered was reasonably calculated to enable the specific 
student’s progress.”170 
A month later, the D.C. district court in Middleton v. District 
of Columbia, quoting the D.C. Court of Appeals in Z.B. v. District of 
Columbia for its “key inquiry,”171 found that based on the evidence 
before the IEP team, “it was entirely unreasonable to believe that A.T. 
could receive meaningful educational benefit on the diploma track.”172 
B. Observations 
It will take years for a body of new FAPE cases to advance 
through the administrative and federal review processes.  In fact, in the 
sixteen months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew, only the 
Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have decided a post-
Endrew substantive FAPE case.173  Scholarship analyzing the post-
 
165 Id. at *2. 
166 793 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
167 888 F.3d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
168 Id. at 517. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 524. 
171 312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 128 (D.D.C. 2018). 
172 Id. at 134. 
173 The D.C. Circuit offered advice in an opinion remanding a case to the district court (Z.B. 
v. D.C., 888 F.3d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2018)) that was later followed by another district court 
in the D.C. Circuit (Middleton, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 128). 
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Endrew impact on FAPE cases has just begun174 and will no doubt 
continue as the case law develops around the new FAPE standard.  
However, we offer our observations from our review of the cases 
decided to date. 
Of the seventy cases we reviewed and included in the chart at 
the end of this article, fifty resulted in a FAPE finding.  Twenty 
resulted in a NO FAPE finding.  Of the fifty FAPE cases, all but nine 
began with a FAPE finding at the administrative level that was 
affirmed by the district court and in some cases the court of appeals for 
that Circuit.  Four of the nine FAPE cases began with a NO FAPE 
finding but were reversed by the state review officer.  One was 
reversed by the federal district court for applying the incorrect FAPE 
standard.  One denied an injunction advising the parties to develop a 
new IEP.  Two were remanded for further consideration in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew.  One was remanded by the U.S. 
Supreme Court resulting in a FAPE finding by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  
Of the twenty NO FAPE cases included in the chart, four were 
reversals of a FAPE finding at the administrative level, two were 
reversals of a FAPE finding at the administrative level and remanded 
for a decision in light of Endrew, and one was the Endrew decision that 
was remanded by the Supreme Court resulting in a NO FAPE finding 
by the District of Colorado.  Thirteen of the NO FAPE cases included 
in the chart began with a NO FAPE finding at the administrative level 
that was affirmed by the district court and in some cases the court of 
appeals for that Circuit. 
Consistent with the above results, in virtually all seventy 
opinions we reviewed, the court mentioned or discussed at length the 
importance of deference to the administrative hearing officer’s 
findings.  In fact, in one case the district court referred to the due 
weight owed the hearing officer’s decision as “great deference.”175 
Notably, in forty-nine of the cases reviewed, the parents were 
seeking monetary relief from the school district.  Thirty requested 
tuition reimbursement for private school.  Thirteen requested 
 
174 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Endrew F. After Six Months: A Game Changer?, 348 EDUC. 
LAW REP. 585 (2017); Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F. One Year Later: An 
Updated Outcomes Analysis, 352 EDUC. LAW REP. 448 (2018); Mark C. Weber, Endrew F. 
and Fry Symposium, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 425 (2017). 
175 S.M. v. Hendry Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 2:14-cv-237-FtM-38CM, 2017 WL 4417070, at *2 
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2017). 
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compensatory education.  Four requested both.  Two requested the 
school district pay for an independent evaluation. 
Regarding the language used by the courts in the various 
circuits to describe their post-Endrew substantive FAPE standard, the 
question remains what language will be used to quantify the new 
standard now that “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits”176 has been replaced with “reasonably calculated 
to enable a child to make progress in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”177   
In our review of the post-Endrew FAPE cases, no circuit used 
the “merely more than de minimis” language rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Endrew178 and several acknowledged its demise.  However, 
no two circuits used the exact same language or approach.  Many 
courts simply repeated the Endrew standard without attempting to 
quantify the progress required for a FAPE.  There was definitely a 
focus on the circumstances or unique circumstances of the child, 
although some courts substituted “potential” or “disability” for 
“circumstances.”  However, one district court from the Ninth Circuit 
did caution that the “[s]tudent’s circumstances do not require lowering 
the properly-calibrated goals for his progress.”179 
Some courts described the necessary progress (or benefit) 
required for a FAPE as “meaningful.”  One court used the term “some 
meaningful progress.”180  Some courts combined the old language with 
the new language like “meaningful educational program that was 
reasonably calculated to enable M.P. to make progress appropriate in 
light of his circumstances”;181 or “‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the 
child to receive appropriate services in light of the child’s individual 
circumstances” and “services are appropriate when they are reasonably 
calculated to provide a child with ‘meaningful educational 
benefits.’”182  
 
176 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982). 
177 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99 
(2017). 
178 Id. at 1000-01. 
179 Unknown Party v. Gilbert Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV-1602614-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL 
3225189, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2017).  
180 Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch. v. Maez, No. 16-cv-1082 WJ/WPL, 2017 WL 
3278945 at *13 (D.N.M. Aug 1, 2017). 
181 Mr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 757 (2d Cir. 2018). 
182 Jack J. ex rel. Jennifer S. v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-3793, 2018 WL 
3397552, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2018).  
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Several courts appeared to follow the advice of the Supreme 
Court in Endrew by requiring the IEP to be appropriately ambitious183 
and to include challenging objectives184 in light of the child’s 
circumstances.  One U.S. Magistrate Judge described the proper 
substantive FAPE standard as “the educational benefit that an IEP is 
designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful’ and ‘appropriately 
ambitious in light of the student’s circumstances.’”185 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
In the year and a half since the Endrew decision, courts have 
grappled with the implications of the Endrew ruling when adjudicating 
FAPE cases.  In this section we extrapolate implications from the High 
Court’s ruling and subsequent court rulings to this point.   
A. Implication-The demise of the de minimis 
educational benefit standard.   
The responses of the Supreme Court Justices in the oral 
arguments clearly revealed their skepticism of the de minimis standard.  
For example, Justice Kagan remarked that the de minimis standard “is 
so low, so easy to meet.”186  Similarly, Justice Ginsburg noted that the 
“formulation more than de minimis sets the level [of educational 
benefit] too low.”187 
According to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Endrew:  
When all is said and done, a student offered an 
educational program providing “merely more than de 
minimis” progress from year to year can hardly be said 
to have been offered an education at all. For children 
with disabilities receiving, instruction that aims so low 
would be tantamount to “sitting idly . . . awaiting the 
 
183 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000. 
184 Id.  
185 E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:16-CV-0058, 2017 WL 
3017282, at *13 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2017). 
186 Oral Argument at 32:30, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 
137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-827. 
187 Id. at 38:00. 
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time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’” The 
IDEA demands more.188 
The Supreme Court’s new standard is undoubtedly higher than 
the de minimis educational benefit standard.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court found “little significance in the Court’s language [in Rowley] 
concerning the requirement that States provide instruction calculated 
to ‘confer some educational benefit.’”189  The demise of the de minimis 
educational benefit standard seems clear; it is doubtful that the de 
minimis terminology will be used in future FAPE cases. 
B. Implication-The Supreme Court raises the 
educational benefit bar.   
In addition to jettisoning the de minimis educational benefit 
standard, the Court clearly favored adopting a higher educational 
benefit standard.  In oral arguments both Justices Kagan and Ginsburg 
were in favor of adopting “a standard with a bite.”190   
In the Endrew opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that a 
student’s “IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress.  After 
all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing 
academic and functional advancement.”191  In fact, the Court found that 
“[a] substantive standard not focused on student progress would do 
little to remedy the pervasive and tragic academic stagnation that 
prompted Congress to act.”192  Thus, the Court’s new standard is: “To 
meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an 
IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress 
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”193 
In addition to the new educational progress standard, the High 
Court offered guidance on how schools may develop an IEP that is 
reasonably calculated to provide progress.  For example, the Court 
noted the importance of a full and individualized assessment of a 
 
188 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (alteration in original). 
189 Id. at 998. 
190 Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with Proper Standard for Measuring 
Educational Benefits for Children with Disabilities, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2017, 6:12PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-justices-grapple-proper-standard-
measuring-educational-benefits-children-disabilities/. 
191 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. 
192 Id.  
193 Id. 
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student’s needs that becomes the basis of his or her IEP.  According to 
the High Court: 
A focus on the particular child is at the core of the IDEA.  The 
instruction offered must be “specially designed” to meet a child’s 
“unique needs” through an “[i]ndividualized education program.”  An 
IEP is not a form document.  It is constructed only after careful 
consideration of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability, 
and potential for growth.194  The resulting IEP must then include 
challenging, ambitious, and measurable annual goals and special 
education services, related services, and program modifications that 
are based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable.195  
Moreover, the IEP must include a method for monitoring and 
measuring student progress during the course of instruction so that 
educational changes may be made if necessary.196  Appropriate training 
is of utmost importance in developing teachers and administrators who 
can draft IEPs that (a) are based on relevant and meaningful 
assessment, (b) include ambitious measurable annual goals, and (c) 
measure students’ progress using evidence-based strategies.197 
According to the Supreme Court, the child’s “educational 
program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances, 
just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for 
most children in the regular classroom.  The goals may differ, but every 
child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”198 
C. Implication-The importance of the right words.   
Justice Sotomayor believed that “the [IDEA] provides enough 
to set a clear standard.”199  She also summed up the court’s dilemma in 
attempting to elevate the educational benefit standard when she 
remarked that “the words are what we’re trying to . . . come to that 
would be less confusing to everyone.”200 
Time will tell if the emphasis on “progress appropriate in light 
of the child’s circumstances”201 proves to be less confusing to the 
 
194 Id. 
195 Yell et al., supra note 23, at 83.  
196 Id. 
197 Id.  
198 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017). 
199 Oral Argument, supra note 186, at 21:50. 
200 Id.  
201 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. 
31
Conroy and Yell: Free Appropriate Public Education
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
132 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
courts.  The words, however, have not proven to be confusing to either 
the U.S. Department of Education or advocacy groups.   
On December 7, 2017, the Office of Special Education and 
Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter “OSERS”) in the U.S. Department 
of Education issued a question and answer document on the Endrew 
ruling.202  Part of the mission of OSERS is to develop and disseminate 
information on federal policy regarding the IDEA in the form of 
guidance documents and letters.  The purpose of these documents is to 
provide important information to officials in state education agencies 
and school districts on their obligations in implementing the IDEA.   
According to the Department, the Endrew ruling was 
particularly important because it “informs our efforts to improve 
academic outcomes for children with disabilities.”203  Therefore, the 
purpose of this particular guidance document was to provide “parents 
and other stakeholders information on the issues addressed in Endrew 
F. and the impact of the Court’s decision on the implementation of the 
IDEA.”204  
The Department’s document is divided into the following three 
sections: (a) an overview that explains the facts and the ruling, (b) a 
clarification of the IDEA’s FAPE requirement, and (c) the 
Department’s interpretation of how the Endrew ruling can be 
implemented in special education programs.205  The question and 
answer document is very specific in the advice it provides to special 
educators.  For example, some of the questions posed and answered 
include the following: Question 11 “What does ‘progress appropriate 
in light of the child’s circumstances mean?”  Question 12, “How can 
an IEP Team ensure that every child has the chance to meet 
challenging objectives?”  Question 13, “How can IEP Teams 
determine if IEP annual goals are appropriately ambitious?”  Question 
15, “What actions should IEP Teams take if a child is not making 
progress at the level the IEP Team expected?”206    
Similarly, an organization consisting of fifteen nonprofit parent 
advocacy groups for children and youth with disabilities called 
 
202 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Q&A) ON U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE 
DECISION ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1 (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/qa-endrewcase-12-07-2017.pdf. 
203 Id. at 1. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 2. 
206 Id. 
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Understood maintains a website for parents of children with 
disabilities.207  A few months after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Endrew the website posted the downloadable “Endrew F. Advocacy 
Toolkit.”208  The toolkit includes the “Endrew F. Talking Points to 
Advocate for Your Child.”209  The talking points document consists of 
eight points including an area that should be discussed at a child’s IEP 
meeting, a quotation from the Endrew opinion that addresses that 
point, another quotation from the U.S. Department of Education’s 
letters of policy guidance that also addresses that point, and an 
explanation of what the quotation means written in parent-friendly 
language.  The second document in the toolkit is the “Endrew F. 
Worksheet for Strengthening Your Child’s IEP.”210  The Worksheet 
consists of eight points, each of which includes the relevant talking 
point, two lists that require a child’s parents to write down what they 
were dissatisfied with about their child’s IEP (e.g., “List where you 
feel your child’s IEP goals aren’t ambitious enough.”) and what 
actions they would like to see taken by the IEP team (e.g., “What goals 
would you like to see?”), and a suggested script for the parents to use 
at the IEP meeting (e.g., “I know that my child’s goals should be 
appropriately ambitious.  Even if my child is behind in academics, the 
IEP goals should aim to help my child catch up.”).  The availability of 
this information increases the likelihood that IEP teams will include 
parents of children and youth with disabilities and advocates who are 
knowledgeable about the Endrew ruling and are equipped to discuss 
the decision at IEP team meetings. 
The largest professional organization for teachers and 
administrators in special education and for children and youth with 
disabilities and their parents is the Council for Exceptional Children.211  
 
207 UNDERSTOOD, HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTOOD.ORG/EN (LAST VISITED JAN. 30, 2019). 
208 Endrew F. Advocacy Toolkit, UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/en/school-
learning/your-childs-rights/basics-about-childs-rights/download-endrew-f-advocacy-toolkit 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
209 Endrew F. Talking Points to Advocate for Your Child, UNDERSTOOD, 
https://www.understood.org/~/media/7bea7527cfb14717b42e0689ae5a57be.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2019).  
210 Endrew F. Worksheet for Strengthening Your Child’s IEP, UNDERSTOOD, 
https://www.understood.org/~/media/1354d644263349ac930decaed20a8389.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2019). 
211 COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, HTTPS://WWW.CEC.SPED.ORG/ (LAST VISITED JAN. 
30, 2019). 
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The Council has undertaken an effort to inform their membership 
about the Endrew decision through webinars and publications.212   
Our analysis of the case law since the Endrew ruling affirms 
the importance deference plays in the U.S. District Courts and U.S. 
Courts of Appeals decisions.  Of course, the role that deference plays 
is mitigated by the facts and the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement 
that “[a] reviewing court may fairly expect those [school] authorities 
to be able to offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their 
decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to make progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”213   
D. Implication-The importance of parental 
participation in the special education process.  
According to Barbara Bateman, the most basic procedural 
requirement of the IDEA, is that parents must be full and equal 
participants with school district personnel in the development of their 
child’s special education program.214 In fact, in the 1982 Rowley 
decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
[W]e think that the importance Congress attached to 
these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. It 
seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed 
every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with 
procedures giving parents and guardians a large 
measure of participation at every stage of the 
administrative process . . . as it did upon the 
measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive 
standard.215   
Similarly, in the Endrew ruling, the Supreme Court noted that 
a child’s “IEP must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of 
procedures . . . [that] emphasize collaboration among parents and 
educators.”216  Additionally, in Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.,217 
 
212 Id. 
213 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1002 (2017). 
214 Barbara D. Bateman, Individual Education Programs for Children with Disabilities, in 
HANDBOOK OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 87, 88 (James M. Kauffman et al. eds., 2012). 
215 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 205, 205-06 
(1982).  
216 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994. 
217 550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007). 
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the High Court held that a student’s parents can prosecute their own 
IDEA claims in federal court pro se because the “IDEA grants parents 
independent, enforceable rights” including not only rights related to 
certain procedural and reimbursement matters but also the “entitlement 
to a free appropriate public education” for their child.218  Moreover, 
according to the IDEA, procedural violations committed by school 
district personnel may lead to a ruling that FAPE was denied when the 
procedural violations “significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity 
to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of 
a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child.”219  
Seemingly, the IDEA and these special education rulings from the 
Supreme Court put parents and school district personnel on a level 
playing field. 
In practice, however, the existence of a level playing field 
between parents and school district personnel is uncertain.  In 2005, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast220 ruled that when parents 
challenge their child’s FAPE, because they are the party seeking relief, 
they bear the burden of proof.221  Thus, parents must have more 
evidence on their side to prevail and they will lose even in situations 
in which the evidence presented by both sides is essentially equal.  
Because school districts have more funds to spend on experts and 
experienced attorneys, this decision seems to tilt the playing field in 
favor of the school district.  In 2006, the playing field became even 
less level when the Supreme Court, in Arlington Central School 
District Board of Education v. Murphy, ruled that even in situations in 
which parents prevail in IDEA cases, they are not entitled to be 
reimbursed for fees spent on expert witnesses.222  In his dissent, Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Stevens, noted that Congress had 
intended to include expert witness fees as recoverable costs as 
indicated in the conference committee report.223  Justice Breyer argued 
that parents’ “rights and procedural protections may be seriously 
diminished if parents are unable to obtain reimbursement for the costs 
of their experts.”224  Justice Breyer also noted that requiring parents to 
 
218 Id. 
219 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II) (2018).  
220 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
221 Id. at 51.  
222 548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006). 
223 Id. at 309 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
224 Id. at 313-14. 
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bear the costs of their own experts is “a far cry from the level playing 
field that Congress envisioned.”225 
Claire Raj and Emily Suski wrote on the burden of these two 
rulings:  
This burden is felt most keenly by parents of limited 
financial means who are unable to pay for experts and 
attorneys who would help them carry this weight and 
serve as a true check on a school’s duty to provide a 
FAPE that enables their child “to make progress 
appropriate in light of [his or her] circumstances.”226 
Raj and Suski also suggested that when Congress revisits the IDEA, 
because school districts have an affirmative duty to provide a FAPE, 
the law should be amended to shift the burden of proof from parents to 
school district officials.227  Similarly, allowing the recovery of expert 
witness fees would help to level the playing field, as the IDEA Fairness 
Restoration Act bill attempted to do in 2011.228  This effort, which was 
introduced in the House by then Congressman Chris Van Hollen and 
in the Senate229 by then Senator Thomas Harkin, did not become law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the de minimis or trivial view of educational 
benefit has been overturned in Endrew.  To ensure adherence to the 
new educational benefit standard, students’ IEPs must be based on 
relevant, meaningful, and individualized assessments of their needs.  
Additionally, students’ annual IEP goals should be challenging, 
appropriately ambitious, and measurable.  Finally, students’ progress 
toward their annual goals should be monitored using databased 
measurement systems.  When determining whether a school district 
has met the educational benefit standard of Endrew, and provided a 
student with FAPE, hearing officers and judges will need to determine 
if an IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the student to make 
 
225 Id. at 316.  
226 Claire Raj & Emily Suski, Endrew F.’s Unintended Consequences, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 499, 
525 (2017) (alteration in original). 
227 Id. at 524. 
228 H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/ 
house-bill/1208.  See also Raj & Suski, supra note 226, at 524. 
229 S. 613, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/sen 
ate-bill/613. 
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progress appropriate in light of his or her circumstances.  It will take 
time and future decisions to determine exactly how courts will interpret 
the Endrew standard.  It would appear, nonetheless, that the Endrew 
ruling was a victory for students with disabilities and their parents. 
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